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PROBATE WILL FEEL A RIPPLE
Fredrick E. Vars*
Mississippi Initiative 26 would have only a small effect on the
probate transfer of property. The initiative would add the
following new section to the Mississippi Constitution:
Person defined. As used in this Article III of the state
constitution, "The term 'person' or 'persons' shall include
every human being from the moment of fertilization, cloning
or the functional equivalent thereof."1
The first clause is critical: the initiative would modify the
definition of "person" as used in Article III, not as used in any
state statute affecting inheritance or in anyone's will. There
would, therefore, be no direct effect on intestacy or will transfers.
But would there be an indirect effect?
Article 1II, Mississippi's Bill of Rights, includes prohibitions
on the deprivation of property without due proceSS2 and the taking
of property without due compensation.3 One could argue that
limiting the right to inherit (receive), the right of descent (pass by
intestacy), and the right to devise (give by will) to individuals who
have been born alive 4 violates due process and amounts to an
* Associate Professor, University of Alabama School of Law. Thanks to Al Brophy,
Chris Green, Bob Harada, Caroline Harada, Catherine Harada, and Grace Lee for
helpful discussion and comments.
1 Miss. Initiative 26 (2011) (proposed MIss. CONST. art. III, § 33), available at
http://www.sos.ms.gov/Elections/Initiatives/Initiatives/Definition%/ 200fo2OPerson-
PW%20Revised.pdf.
2 MISS. CONST. art. III, § 14.
3 MISS. CONST. art. III, § 17 (this section uses the word "owner," not "person"). The
structure of the Bill of Rights implies that it protects the rights of "persons." See MIss.
CONST. art. III, § 24 ("All courts shall be open; and every person for an injury done him
in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and
right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay."); see also
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1214 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "owner" as: "One who has the
right to possess, use, and convey something; a person in whom one or more interests
are vested." (emphasis added)).
4 Harper v. Archer, 12 Miss. (4 S. & M.), 1845 WL 1978, at *7 (1845); see also
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-104(a)(2) (2008).
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uncompensated taking. Historically, an insurmountable hurdle for
this argument would have been that "[r]ights of succession to the
property of a deceased, whether by will or by intestacy, are of
statutory creation" and generally receive no constitutional
protection.5
That general rule, however, has been modified so that now a
total abrogation of the rights of descent and devise can amount to
a taking.6 The right to devise of unborn "persons" (along with all
minors) is abrogated by the probate code because no one under
eighteen years of age, nor a guardian on his or her behalf, can
execute a will.7 The right of descent is a tougher question. The
Mississippi intestacy statute applies "[w]hen any person shall die"
with property not devised.8 The general, statutory definition of
"person" is not illuminating,9 but standard legal definitions of
"death" strongly suggest that only individuals born alive-with
vital signs and brain function-can "die."' 0
This interpretation would render Mississippi's probate code
unconstitutional as to unborn "persons" by totally abrogating their
rights of descent and devise. Faced with this constitutional defect,
Mississippi courts would likely incorporate the new constitutional
definition of "person" into the intestacy statute and decide that a
change in circumstance which renders eventual birth impossible
constitutes "death." The practical result would be that the
property of unborn "persons" would descend to kin, if any come
forward, rather than automatically escheating to the State."
This conclusion holds only for the right to transmit, which is
relatively minor given that unborn "persons" are unlikely to have
5 Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942).
6 See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716-17 (1987). There is no Mississippi case law
adopting Hodel as a matter of state constitutional law, but Mississippi courts generally
look to federal takings law in interpreting the state takings clause. E.g., Walters v.
City of Greenville, 751 So. 2d 1206, 1210 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
7 MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-5-1 (2004); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 17
cmt. b (1958).
8 MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 91-1-3, -11 (2004).
9 MISS. CODE ANN. § 1-3-39 (2005).
10 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 458 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "death"). But cf. 66 Fed.
Credit Union v. Tucker, 853 So. 2d 104, 114 (Miss. 2003) (en banc) (holding that the
mother could bring a wrongful death action on behalf of her unborn child "quick" in the
womb).
11 27A AM. JUR. 2D Escheat §§ 4, 5 (2008).
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their own property. The bigger question is whether such "persons"
would inherit. They would not. Unlike the rights to descent and
devise, there is no constitutionally protected right to inherit.12
Thus, with the exception of property owned by unborn "persons,"
the existing scheme of probate property distribution should
stand.13 In probate, the initiative would make a ripple, not a
splash.
12 Shapira v. Union Nat'l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 828 (C.P. Ohio 1974).
13 My analysis assumes some variety of textualism is the appropriate approach. See
Christopher R. Green, A Textual Analysis of the Possible Impact of Measure 26 on the
Mississippi Bill of Rights, 81 Miss. L.J. SUPRA 39 (2011). Other contributors to this
symposium (and editorialists) believe Mississippi courts would read the new
amendment more broadly as a statement of public policy affecting cases in the absence
of direct constitutional commands. E.g., Deborah Bell, Disputes over Frozen Embryos,
81 Miss. L.J. SUPRA 105 (2011); Editorial, The 'Personhood'Initiative, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
28, 2011, at A30, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/28/opinion/the-
personhood-initiative.html. This broad reading is certainly possible, but more likely in
cases involving the core concerns of the initiative supporters, like abortion and IVF,
than it is in peripheral areas like inheritance.
